In the context of an in…nitely repeated capacity-constrained price game, we endogenize the composition of a cartel when …rms are heterogeneous in their capacities. When …rms are su¢ ciently patient, there exists a stable cartel involving the largest …rms. A …rm with su¢ ciently small capacity is not a member of any stable cartel. When a cartel is not all-inclusive, colluding …rms set a price that serves as an umbrella with non-cartel members pricing below it and producing at capacity. Contrary to previous work, our results suggest that the most severe coordinated e¤ects may come from mergers involving moderate-sized …rms, rather than the largest or smallest …rms.
Introduction
A common assumption in the theory of collusion is that all …rms participate in the cartel. While clearly there are instances in which cartels are indeed all-inclusive, it is probably more common for a cartel to be lacking some sellers. 1 For example, the global citric acid cartel of the early to mid 1990s comprised Archer Daniels Midland, Cerestar Bioproducts, Haarman & Reimer, Ho¤man La Roche, and Jungbunzlauer who, at the time of cartel formation, encompassed 60% of global production and 67% of E.U. production. Of particular note is that Chinese suppliers were not part of the citric acid cartel. The exclusion of Chinese suppliers also occurred with cartels in vitamins B1, B2, and C. For vitamin B1, the increase in Chinese supply during the …rst three years of collusion resulted in the cartel's global market share declining from 70% to 52%. For vitamin B2, the U.S. producer Coors was also noticeably absent from the cartel. In the 13 year-long European industrial tubes cartel, the cartel controlled about 75-85% of total production and excluded at least two signi…cant producers. In the Danish district heating pipes cartel, the Swedish …rm Powerpipe, which was a sizable competitor, chose not to join the cartel. There are many other examples in which a signi…cant amount of supply was provided by …rms who did not participate in the cartel. 2 The recognition that a cartel need not encompass all …rms generates a number of interesting questions. Under what industry conditions can we expect a cartel to be all-inclusive? When a cartel is not all-inclusive and …rms are heterogeneous, what are the traits of those …rms that join the cartel? How does a merger a¤ect the composition and size of a cartel? Once the composition of the cartel is endogenized, more traditional issues -such as the determinants of the cartel price and properties of cartel price paths -could also be a¤ected. For example, when cartels are presumed to be all-inclusive, an event such as a two-…rm merger can in ‡uence the cartel price because it replaces two cartel members with just one and thus alters the incentive compatibility constraints determining the collusive price (as well as possibly altering the characteristics of the a¤ected cartel members). But if the cartel itself is endogenous, a merger could impact how many and which …rms comprise a cartel. A merger between two non-cartel members could result in the merged …rm joining the cartel and thereby expanding the cartel's impact. Understanding the coordinated e¤ects of a merger then requires investigating which …rms are likely to form a cartel.
The objective of this paper is to address these and related questions by endogenizing cartel formation in the context of an in…nitely repeated price game with homogeneous goods where …rms are heterogeneous in their capacities. For a given composition, a cartel is assumed to achieve the best collusive outcome while respecting incentive compatibility constraints (which ensure stability of that outcome) and 1 The ensuing examples are from Harrington (2006) and are based on information from European Commission decisions over [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . 2 Hay and Kelly (1974), for instance, analyzes 65 cartel cases in the U.S. between 1963 and 1972. They report market shares of cartels in 45 cases and in approximately two-thirds of these cases the cartel was not all-inclusive. See also Gri¢ n (1989) who studies 54 well-known international cartels, 53 of which were incomplete. taking account of the behavior of …rms outside the cartel. We then focus on the set of stable cartels where a cartel is stable when all cartel members prefer to be in the cartel and all non-cartel members prefer to be outside the cartel. While there has been previous work that endogenizes cartel membership, which we brie ‡y review below, our model is the …rst to endogenize the composition of a cartel in the context of an in…nitely repeated game with heterogeneous …rms.
In summarizing some of our …ndings, we show that stable cartels are often not all-inclusive. When a cartel does not encompass all …rms, equilibrium has the cartel setting a price which serves as an umbrella for the non-cartel members in that they price just below the cartel price. Non-cartel members produce at capacity, and cartel members produce below capacity. In exploring the incentives associated with joining a cartel, a …rm faces a trade-o¤. By becoming a member of the cartel, more capacity is brought under the control of the cartel, which leads to a higher cartel price. Hence, a …rm bene…ts from a higher price-cost margin by joining the cartel. The downside is that it is forced to reduce its sales; it goes from producing at capacity to below capacity. A …rm …nds it optimal not to join the cartel when its capacity is su¢ ciently low because the e¤ect of its membership on price is trivial but, at the same time, it experiences a non-trivial reduction in its output. Thus, we should not expect a cartel to include very small …rms.
Towards understanding general properties of stable cartels, a characterization result is provided. If …rms are su¢ ciently patient, then there always exists a stable cartel comprising the largest …rms in the industry. To further make the case that we can expect larger …rms to be in cartels, we show that if a …rm …nds it optimal to join a cartel then any larger …rm also …nds it optimal; while if a …rm …nds it optimal not to join a cartel then any smaller …rm also …nds it better to be outside the cartel. While there can be stable cartels that do not comprise the largest …rms, there is much to argue that we should expect cartels to be made up of the largest …rms. Some additional results related to mergers are reviewed below after discussing the literature.
Previous research has endogenized cartel membership and found cartels to be less than all-inclusive but, with one recent exception, all that work has been conducted in a static framework. Early pioneering work includes Selten (1973) , d 'Aspremont et al (1983) , Donsimoni (1985) , and Donsimoni, Economides, and Polemarchakis (1986) . While this work has been highly useful, it is subject to the criticism that it presumes price is set to maximize joint cartel pro…t and thus does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints ensuring cartel stability.
Within the in…nitely repeated game framework, Compte, Jenny, and Rey (2002) and Vasconcelos (2005) also consider collusion when …rms are heterogeneous in terms of capital stocks, though they make the standard assumption of an all-inclusive cartel. As in our model, Compte et al (2002) consider the homogeneous goods capacityconstrained price game when …rms have di¤erent capacity stocks. They explore the impact of the distribution of capacity on the minimum discount factor for sustaining the joint pro…t maximum. When the largest …rm is not too large, the minimum discount factor depends only on the level of aggregate capacity and not on how it is distributed across …rms. Thus, marginal reallocations of capacity across …rms has no e¤ect on the ease of collusion. When instead the largest …rm is su¢ ciently large (more speci…cally, the aggregate capacity of all …rms but the largest …rm is insu¢ cient to meet market demand at the competitive price), the minimum discount factor for the cartel is determined by the capacity of the largest …rm as it has the strongest incentive to cheat. Hence, shifting capacity from the largest …rm to the other …rms makes collusion easier. Vasconcelos (2005) considers the homogeneous goods quantity game in which more capital reduces marginal cost for a convex cost function, and investigates, like Compte et al (2002) , the determinants of the minimum discount factor for sustaining the joint pro…t maximum. The minimum discount factor depends on the capacity of the largest …rm but, contrarily to Compte et al (2002) , also depends on the capacity of the smallest …rm. In fact, it is the smallest …rm that has the greatest incentive to deviate from the collusive outcome, while it is the largest …rm that has the greatest incentive to deviate from the punishment (which is a most severe punishment). Thus, collusion is easier when capital is transferred from the largest …rm to the smallest …rm; in that sense, less asymmetry is conducive to collusion.
With the assumption of an all-inclusive cartel, Compte et al (2002) and Vasconcelos (2005) then …nd that it is the capital stocks of the extremal …rms that matter. This is not the case in our model when cartel membership is endogenous and incomplete. To begin, su¢ ciently small …rms are not part of the cartel and thus modest changes in their capacity have no e¤ect. Furthermore, shifts in capacity among …rms who would be members of the cartel anyway also do not have an e¤ect. 3 Rather, our analysis suggests that it is the reallocation of capacity among moderate-sized …rms that is likely to have the most signi…cant coordinated e¤ects. For example, the merger of two moderate-sized …rms could induce them to join the cartel when, in the pre-merger scenario, they would choose to be outside the cartel.
There is a pair of recent papers which do endogenize cartel composition in the context of an in…nitely repeated game. Escrihuela-Villar (2008a,b) examines an in…nitely repeated quantity setting with homogeneous goods. 4 Similar to Compte et al (2002) and Vasconcelos (2005) , the collusive outcome is assumed to be the joint pro…t maximum (given the cartel size). As it is assumed there are no capital stocks and …rms are identical, our analysis is complementary in that we focus on the traits of those …rms that make up stable cartels.
In the next section, the model is described. In Section 3, the equilibrium pricing behavior of the non-cartel members is characterized. The results of Section 3 are then embodied in Section 4 where a cartel's pricing problem is modelled and solved. That analysis takes as given a particular composition to the cartel. This composition is endogenized in Section 5, and we explore the characteristics of stable cartels. In doing so, we assume a proporational sharing rule among cartel members. In Appendix A, we provide a justi…cation for it based on fairness. Section 6 investigates the coordinated e¤ects of a merger, and section 7 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix B.
Model
There are n …rms competing in an in…nitely repeated capacity-constrained price game with homogeneous products. Capacity stocks are …xed and, at any moment, the entire history is common knowledge so there is perfect monitoring. 2 (0; 1) is the common …rm discount factor and each …rm's payo¤ is the expected present value of its pro…t stream.
The market demand function is D (p) which is assumed to be a twice continuously di¤erentiable and decreasing function of price. (It can have a choke price and thus be zero for prices at or above the choke price.) Firms have a common marginal cost c 0: Assume D (c) > 0 and monopoly pro…t, (p c) D (p), is strictly concave. Let p m denote the monopoly price:
Firms simultaneously make price decisions and then a …rm produces to meet its demand up to capacity. Let k i denote the capacity of …rm i and D i p i ; p i denote its demand given its price, p i , and the vector of other …rms' prices, p i . Several assumptions are made on …rm demand, all of which seem reasonable. In stating these assumptions, let (p) fj : p j < pg denote the set of …rms that price below p, and (p) fj : p j = pg be the set of …rms that price at p.
Assuming the standard parallel rationing rule, A1 just comes from consumers preferring lower priced …rms. A2 and A3 impose some symmetry across …rms. A2 says that if the …rms that charge a common price have, in sum, excess capacity then residual demand is allocated so that all …rms have excess capacity; and if residual demand is positive then they all have positive demand. A3 deals with the converse case in that if the …rms that charge a common price do not have enough capacity to meet residual demand then all …rms have excess demand.
For technical reasons, the set of feasible prices for a …rm is assumed to be countable with an increment of " > 0: A …rm then chooses its price from the set f0; "; : : : ; c "; c; c + "; : : :g. Results will be derived for when " is small.
To simplify the analysis, some plausible though restrictive assumptions are placed on …rms'capacities. It is assumed that each …rm has insu¢ cient capacity to supply the monopoly demand, and any n 1 …rms can meet competitive demand.
The well-known implication of the second part of A4 is that the competitive solution is a stage game Nash equilibrium. The …rst part has the implication that, when it has the lowest price (subject to the price not exceeding the monopoly price), a …rm's demand exceeds its capacity which implies it'll produce at capacity. A4 then requires that the largest …rm is not too large. This property will signi…cantly simplify the analysis and seems plausible for many markets.
Though A4 implies n 3, this implication is not restrictive because the focus of our research is on endogenizing membership in a cartel and the analysis only becomes relevant when there are at least three …rms. To further explore the implications of A4, suppose demand is linear: D (p) = a bp where a bc > 0:
Summing up the latter condition across all …rms but i and combining with the …rst condition, we have:
A necessary condition for A4 to be satis…ed with linear demand is then:
Hence, if demand is linear then a necessary condition for A4 to be true is that there are at least four …rms. It is clear that A4 comes with some loss of generality but is likely to hold for many industries.
Static Nash Equilibrium for Non-cartel Members
In sustaining collusion, we will focus on equilibrium strategy pro…les with several properties. First, it results in a stationary collusive outcome. Second, any deviation from the collusive price by a cartel member results in in…nite reversion to a static Nash equilibrium. Since P j6 =i k j D (c) > 0 8i, the static game has two symmetric Nash equilibria; one has all …rms price at cost, and the other has all …rms price at c+". As results will be characterized when " is small, there is not a substantive di¤erence between these equilibria. Also note that, as " ! 0, the punishment results in the lowest continuation equilibrium payo¤. Third, past behavior by non-cartel members has no e¤ect on cartel members'current behavior. If it did then we would argue that non-cartel members are actually cooperating and thus should be considered part of the cartel.
In this section, we characterize the pricing behavior of non-cartel members in the presence of a single cartel. Since a non-cartel member's price does not a¤ect its continuation payo¤, in equilibrium a non-cartel member necessarily chooses price to maximize current pro…t. Thus, non-cartel members are assumed to achieve a static Nash equilibrium while taking as given the common price set by cartel members. Implicitly, all …rms -including those not in the cartel -are then aware that there is a cartel.
We want to focus on cartels and collusive prices whereby the cartel earns more than it would if it did not collude. This requires that the collusive price exceeds c + " and, at the collusive price, the cartel has positive demand. In that case, Lemma 1 shows that each non-colluding …rm's equilibrium price puts zero mass on prices equal to or above the price charged by the cartel. Thus, non-cartel members undercut the collusive price. Let denote the set of …rms in the cartel. All proofs are in Appendix B.
Lemma 1 Assume cartel prices at p 0 > c + " and non-colluding …rms set Nash equilibrium prices. If the cartel earns positive pro…t then, for su¢ ciently small ", each non-colluding …rm prices below p 0 with probability one.
Suppose p 0 (> c + ") is a collusive price that, given the non-colluding …rms price optimally, yields positive pro…t for the cartel. Then, by Lemma 1, cartel demand is max
then cartel demand and pro…t are zero which contradicts p 0 yielding positive cartel pro…t. Thus, if p 0 is a collusive price that yields positive pro…t for the cartel then it must be true that D (p 0 ) > P j = 2 k j ; so there is residual demand for the cartel. Given that property, Lemma 2 shows that an equilibrium has the non-colluding …rms all pricing just below the cartel price.
Lemma 2
If cartel prices at p 0 > c + " and D (p 0 ) > P j = 2 k j then, for su¢ ciently small "; it is an equilibrium for non-colluding …rm j to price at p 0 " and sell k j units, 8j = 2 .
To summarize, necessary conditions for the cartel to earn higher pro…t than at a static Nash equilibrium are that the cartel price p 0 exceeds c + " and the non-cartel members have insu¢ cient capacity to meet demand at the cartel price, D (p 0 ) > P j = 2 k j : When the price grid is su¢ ciently …ne, the equilibrium response of the noncartel members is to just undercut the collusive price with a price of p 0 ". As this leaves residual demand to the cartel of
To derive precise predictions, it is critical to perform an equilibrium selection. In particular, multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes is rampant because of the many ways that cartel demand can be allocated among its members. We will assume that demand is allocated within the cartel proportional to a …rm's capacity so that colluding …rm i's pro…t is
There are two primary reasons for making this speci…cation. First, this allocation rule has occurred in practice; for example, it was used by the Norwegian cement cartel (Röller and Steen, 2006) and several German cartels during the early 20th century (Bloch, 1932 ; cited in Scherer, 1980) . Also see Vasconcelos (2005) , who assumed this allocation rule and cites some other cartels that used it. Second, this sharing rule can be derived by applying the notion of fairness prescribed by Rawls (1971) in A Theory of Justice. The derivation is provided in Appendix A, which is best read after reading Section 4.
Equilibrium Price and Cartel Size
Given a cartel and a cartel price p; cartel member i 2 earns current pro…t of
The collusive value for …rm i is then
where
is the present value of the pro…t stream per unit of capacity for a cartel member. Note that a cartel member's pro…t depends only on its capacity and the amount of capacity in the cartel; in particular, it doesn't matter how the capacity is distributed among the other cartel members or among the non-cartel members.
Recall that the collusive outcome is to be supported by the threat of in…nite reversion to a static Nash equilibrium that yields (approximately) zero pro…t. To derive the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) for cartel member i, …rst note that a cartel member that deviates from the collusive price ought to maximize current pro…t, given the other colluding …rms are pricing at p and the non-colluding …rms are pricing at p ": Consider a cartel member who deviates by pricing at p ": If it has excess capacity at that price then, if " is su¢ ciently small, it'll prefer to price at p 2" rather than p " since doing so leads to a discrete increase in demand. Next note that pricing at p 2" results in it being capacity constrained since
Hence, it won't want to price any lower than p 2". Thus, if the deviant …rm is not capacity-constrained when pricing at p ", it'll optimally price at p 2" and earn pro…t of (p 2" c) k i . If instead it is capacity-constrained at p " then that price is clearly optimal and its pro…t from cheating is (p " c) k i . As we are making " small, the pro…t from cheating is approximately (p c) k i .
The ICC for …rm i 2 is then
The convenient property to note that is that all cartel members have the same ICC, even though they may have di¤erent capacities. Furthermore, since cartel member i's collusive value is k i V (p; ) ; all cartel members agree that they want price chosen to maximize V (p; ) : These properties are an implication of assuming that a …rm's share of cartel supply equals its share of cartel capacity. Given a particular cartel (as de…ned by ), the cartel's problem is to choose a price that maximizes the representative …rm's value while satisfying the ICC. Since the optimal cartel price depends on the members of the cartel only through the capacity that the cartel controls, K , we will re ‡ect the dependence of the optimal cartel price on K :
Using the particular expressions, we have:
De…ne b p (K ) as the maximum price that satis…es the ICC:
Since the objective is strictly concave,
the …rst order condition su¢ ces to de…ne the solution. De…ne p o ( ) as the unconstrained solution:
Since V (p; ) is strictly concave in p then
Finally, de…ne V ( ) as the equilibrium collusive value for cartel :
In exploring the e¤ect of cartel capacity on price, …rst note that if
that is, there is no price exceeding cost which satis…es the ICC. Hence, if
shows that when the cartel is more inclusive -as re ‡ected in more capacity being controlled by the cartel -then the cartel price is higher. Since noncartel members price just below the cartel price then all …rms'prices are higher when the cartel is more encompassing.
Cartel Formation
Since a cartel is able to support a price in excess of the competitive price if and only if D (c) > K K ; this section will focus on and such that
This condition is assured of holding when is su¢ ciently close to one and is su¢ ciently inclusive (since, by assumption, K > D (c) and thus
. In exploring the endogeniety of participation in a cartel, there are two issues to consider: whether a …rm wants to be a member of a cartel and whether the existing members of a cartel would want a …rm to join. Let us begin by showing that any existing cartel desires to be more inclusive; thus, membership to the cartel is always "open."
Given cartel , recall that if i 2 then …rm i's pro…t is k i V ( ) : Thus, an existing cartel member would want to see …rm j = 2 join the cartel as long as:
As the next result shows, a cartel member's pro…t always increases with a more encompassing cartel.
Corollary 5 Cartel pro…t (and cartel pro…t per unit of cartel capacity) is maximized when the cartel is all-inclusive.
The more problematic issue is whether a …rm would want to join the cartel. If failure to join means there would be no collusion then joining is clearly optimal because positive pro…t as a cartel member is better than the zero pro…t earned under competition. But suppose failure to join meant that the remaining cartel members could and would e¤ectively collude. In that case, the next result shows that larger …rms are more inclined to join a cartel.
and consider i; j = 2 . If k j > k i then: i) if …rm i …nds it optimal to join cartel then so does …rm j; and ii) if …rm j does not …nd it optimal to join cartel then neither does …rm i:
There are two forces at work behind Theorem 6. By Theorem 3, the cartel price is increasing in the capacity controlled by the cartel which means that the cartel price is higher when a new member brings more capacity under the control of the cartel. Secondly, in joining a cartel, a …rm experiences a drop in its sales as it goes from producing at capacity -as an outsider to the cartel -to producing less than capacity. Since a cartel member's share of cartel output is equal to its share of cartel capacity, the percentage reduction in sales from joining a cartel is less for a …rm with more capacity. 5 Both of these e¤ects are in the direction of providing a larger …rm with a stronger incentive to join a cartel. 6 Remark 7 A …rm with more capacity is more inclined to join a cartel.
Not only is the incentive to join a cartel weaker for a smaller …rm, we can make a stronger statement by showing that su¢ ciently small …rms will not join a cartel. When a …rm's capacity is su¢ ciently low, joining the cartel has little e¤ect on the cartel price but results in a …rm experiencing a decrease in its sales, as it goes from producing at capacity to producing below its capacity. Thus, a small …rm experiences a trivial rise in its price-cost margin from becoming a cartel member, while su¤ering a non-trivial fall in its sales.
. If k i is su¢ ciently small then …rm i does not …nd it optimal to join cartel .
Though larger …rms are more inclined than smaller …rms to join a cartel, still unresolved is what a cartel looks like. The …rst step in addressing this issue is to de…ne exactly what it means for a cartel to be stable. Using the de…nition of d 'Aspremont et al (1983) , a cartel is stable if all members prefer to be in the cartel (referred to as "internal stability"), and all non-members prefer to be outside the cartel ("external stability"). In formally stating the de…nition of cartel stability, note that, given a cartel , the (rescaled) pro…t of …rm i 2 is (1
With this de…nition, a cartel member is required to strictly prefer being part of the cartel. By requiring that pro…t be strictly higher by joining a cartel, we can rule out innocuous cartels in which the collusive price is the static Nash equilibrium price, so the cartel has no e¤ect on the market. Thus, a stable cartel necessarily involves a 5 Holding the cartel price …xed at p 0 , the percentage reduction in …rm i's output from joining the cartel is ki
As the derivative of this expression with respect to ki is
then a …rm with larger capacity experiences a smaller percentage reduction in its output from becoming a cartel member. 6 In the proof of Theorem 6, we speci…cally identify these e¤ects in the expression determining the optimality of joining the cartel.
price exceeding the non-collusive price. 7 At the end of this section, we discuss other possible de…nitions of stability.
In light of Theorem 8, we know that stable cartels need not be all-inclusive.
Corollary 10 If one of the …rms is su¢ ciently small then a stable cartel is not all-inclusive.
The next result shows that a cartel is internally stable if and only if the smallest cartel member …nds it optimal to be in a cartel; and it is externally stable if and only if the largest non-cartel member prefers to be an outsider. Thus, in assessing whether a cartel is stable, we need only evaluate the incentives of the smallest cartel member and the largest non-cartel member.
Lemma 11 A cartel is stable if and only if: i) the smallest …rm in …nds it optimal to be in the cartel; and ii) the largest …rm not in …nds it optimal not to be in the cartel.
The next result provides a general existence and characterization of a stable cartel. Enumerate …rms so that: k 1 k 2 k n : Theorem 12 shows there exists a collection of the largest …rms which forms a stable cartel. In this theorem, (m) is the stationary pro…t to …rm m from joining cartel f1; 2; : : : ; m 1g less the stationary pro…t to …rm m being outside of that cartel:
Thus, …rm m …nds it optimal to be a member of cartel f1; 2; : : : ; mg i¤ (m) > 0. Furthermore, by Lemma 11, (m) > 0 is necessary and su¢ cient for the internal stability of cartel f1; 2; : : : ; mg.
Theorem 12 f1; 2; : : : ; m g is a stable cartel where
then m 2 f2; : : : ; ng exists. 7 Our theory of cartel formation does presume that all …rms are eligible to join a cartel. Given the issues of illegality and incentive compatibility associated with collusion, some …rms may not, commonly speaking, "trust" some other …rms and, as a result, exclude them from the cartel. For example, Chinese suppliers may have been excluded from the vitamins cartels because of their unfamiliarity to European, Japanese, and Korean …rms. However, if the Chinese suppliers would not have wanted to join the cartel anyway, then our analysis is applicable.
A stable cartel is then made up of the m largest …rms where m is such that …rm m …nds it optimal to join …rms 1; : : : ; m 1 as a cartel, while …rm m + 1 prefers to stay out of the cartel. If …rms are su¢ ciently patient, such a stable cartel exists. There is no presumption, however, that this stable cartel is unique. However, if we assume market demand is linear, D (p) = a bp; then it can be shown that, among the cartels involving the largest …rms, there is a unique stable one. 8 Theorem 13 Assume demand is linear. If there exists m such that f1; 2; : : : ; m g is a stable cartel, then, generically, m is unique.
Alternative De…nitions of Cartel Stability With our de…nition of cartel stability, a cartel is stable when none of the …rms has an incentive to change its membership decision while taking into account the price adjustments of all rivals to such a change. The literature on coalition formation provides at least two alternative de…nitions of stability. First, a cartel is stable when none of the …rms -by changing its membership decision -can induce a stable cartel that makes the deviating …rm better o¤. By contrast, under our de…nition, if, say, a cartel member chooses to leave the cartel, its exit leaves the cartel unstable. However, after such an exit, other …rms may have an incentive to alter their membership decision and this could ultimately yield a new stable cartel (or the original one). An alternative notion of cartel stability then presumes …rms are farsighted and thereby requires that each …rm compare its pro…t under the current stable cartel with the stable cartel that would be induced if it changed its membership decision. Second, our de…nition of cartel stability does not allow …rms to deviate by forming a non-binding coalition. That is, even though …rms individually have no incentive to deviate, …rms could …nd a joint deviation pro…table. An alternative de…nition of cartel stability then additionally requires that there exists no deviating coalition that is mutually bene…cial. Note that both alternative concepts of cartel stability can be viewed as a re…nement in the sense that they (weakly) reduce the set of stable cartels.
The possibility that …rms are farsighted has been explored in Diamantoudi (2005) when …rms are identical. The focus there is on cartel size where a cartel size is unstable when a …rm can induce a larger or smaller stable cartel in which it earns higher pro…t. Applying this notion of stability to our setting is problematic in that non-existence may occur. For consider a cartel comprising the largest …rms and suppose that the smallest insider and the largest outsider are approximately of equal size. This has two key implications: …rst, the cartel is still stable if these two …rms change places; second, the outsider earns more pro…ts than the insider as both receive the same price and the outsider sells more. According to our de…nition of stability, the smallest insider has no incentive to deviate. Suppose, however, that the smallest insider did exit the cartel. In the new situation, the largest outsider now has an incentive to join the cartel, which again is stable according to our de…nition. In turn, however, the new insider may defect, which provides an incentive for the largest outsider to join again. Thus, when …rms are farsighted then cycling may occur and, as a result, there is no stable cartel. 9 The idea that …rms might deviate by forming mutually bene…cial non-binding agreements is explored in Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) and , where the concept of Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium is introduced. They argue that the Nash best response (as implied by our de…nition of stability) is necessary, but may not be su¢ cient. For example, a stable cartel that is Pareto-dominated is not coalition-proof. We can show, however, that a stable cartel (according to our de…nition) with the highest total capacity is a Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium. Within the set of stable cartels comprising the largest …rms, the candidate for being coalition-proof is then the largest one; that is, the highest m such that f1; : : : ; mg is a stable cartel. While that cartel could well have the largest capacity among all stable cartels -and thereby be coalition-proof -we do not believe that is universally true. In conclusion, while there is no reason to think that the largest stable cartel comprising the largest …rms is not coalition proof, a proof of it eludes us.
Coordinated E¤ects of a Merger
An important element in the evaluation of a merger is a determination of its coordinated e¤ects; that is, to what extent the merger would make collusion more likely or more e¤ective. This issue has been explored in previous work for the case of allinclusive cartels. There it has been shown that a reallocation of capacity within an industry -such as through a merger -a¤ects collusion only when it a¤ects the size of the smallest or largest …rm. Compte et al (2002) shows that the minimum discount factor for an all-inclusive cartel to sustain the joint pro…t maximum is increasing in the capacity of the largest …rm. Hence, a merger involving the largest …rm makes collusion more di¢ cult. 10 Vasconcelos (2005) …nds that collusion is more di¢ cult when the largest …rm is larger and the smallest …rm is smaller. Hence, a merger involving the smallest …rm makes collusion easier, while one involving the largest …rm makes it more di¢ cult.
In our model, mergers are neutral with respect to an all-inclusive cartel because a necessary and su¢ cient condition for an all-inclusive cartel to be e¤ective is >
and thus depends only on aggregate capacity. Furthermore, since price depends only on how much capacity is controlled by the cartel, price is una¤ected by a merger as well. A merger can make a di¤erence, however, when cartels are incomplete and the merger a¤ects the composition of the cartel. It is that issue we explore in this section.
To preview our analysis, we begin with some general results showing that mergers among su¢ ciently large …rms and among su¢ ciently small …rms are neutral. Deriving results for the more general class of mergers is di¢ cult, however, due to the lumpiness of a merger. Assuming linear demand, we o¤er some examples to suggest that it is mergers among moderate-sized …rms that are likely to have the biggest impact. To substantiate this claim, numerical simulations are conducted. 11 Theorem 14 shows that if two or more members of a stable cartel merge then the remaining set of cartel members (including the merged …rm) is a stable cartel. Thus, if a cartel comprises the largest …rms then a merger among the largest …rms has no coordinated e¤ects. 12 Theorem 14 Consider a cartel and suppose that a set of …rms ! merges. Let i ! denote the merged …rm. If is a stable cartel then ! + fi ! g is a stable cartel.
If the …rms involved in the merger are su¢ ciently small then again there are no coordinated e¤ects. This is not surprising in light of Theorem 8 showing that a su¢ ciently small …rm will choose not to collude.
Theorem 15
Suppose that a set of …rms ! merges. If the …rms in ! are su¢ ciently small then the set of stable cartels is unchanged.
For the remainder of this section, linear demand is assumed, D (p) = a bp, and we focus on the set of stable cartels comprising the largest …rms (as characterized in Theorem 12). By Theorem 13, we know that there is a unique cartel in that set. Recall that …rms are enumerated according to their capacity: k 1 k 2 k n : If we further suppose that the discount factor is su¢ ciently close to one so that the ICC for price is not binding for any (pro…table) cartel, it can be shown that cartel f1; : : : ; mg is stable i¤
By (1), we need the smallest …rm in the cartel to be su¢ ciently large; and, by (2), we need the largest …rm outside of the cartel to be su¢ ciently small. By Theorem 13, there is a unique value for m satisfying (1)- (2) .
Suppose the pre-merger cartel is : Focusing on a two-…rm merger between …rms i and j, there are three cases to consider. Let the merged …rm be denoted i=j.
1. i; j 2 so that the merger involves two of the larger …rms in that, prior to the merger, they both would've been in the cartel. By Theorem 14, this merger has no e¤ect.
2. i 2 ; j = 2 so that the merger involves one of the larger …rms (as, prior to the merger, it would've been in the cartel) and one of the smaller …rms (as, prior to the merger, it would not have been in the cartel). We want to show that cartel capacity expands by at most the capacity of the smaller …rm, k j .
(a) Let …rm h be the largest …rm, other than j, which is not in . As the cartel involves the largest …rms, for cartel capacity to go up by more than k j in response to the merger, …rm h must …nd it optimal to join a cartel with capacity K + k j :
Since, prior to the merger, …rm h did not want to join then
Combining these two inequalities, we have:
which gives us a contradiction. Hence, the post-merger cartel must be a subset of fig + fi=jg ; which means post-merger capacity has an upper bound of K + k j .
(b) Let us show by way of example that the change in cartel capacity from the merger can be less than k j and, in fact, can even be negative. That is, a merger between a large and small …rm can reduce the amount of capacity in the cartel and thus lower price. Assume D (p) = 1 p and c = 0 for this and the next example. The static Nash equilibrium supply is then 1 and monopoly supply is 
In the pre-merger situation, a stable cartel involves …rm 1 and any pair of …rms from f2; 3; 4; 5; 6g though, to ease the discussion, let us suppose the stable cartel is = f1; 2; 3g. 13 If there is a merger between …rms 2 and 7 then the merged …rm is the second largest …rm with capacity of 3 10 : The post-merger stable cartel then surely includes …rms 1 and 2/7 and, in fact, …rm 3 no longer desires to be part of the cartel (nor does any other …rm). The addition of the merged …rm has increased cartel capacity to the point that …rm 3 prefers to be outside of the cartel. Since …rm 3's capacity exceeds that of …rm 7, total cartel capacity declines which means that the merger has reduced the equilibrium price.
3. i; j = 2 so that the merger involves two of the smaller …rms (as, prior to the merger, they would not have been in the cartel). Though the merger may have no impact, it could also raise cartel capacity by the sum of the capacities of the two …rms involved in the merger.
(a) If k m+1 k i + k j then the merger has no impact since it leaves una¤ected the largest …rm not in the pre-merger cartel. Thus, if the two …rms involved in the merger are su¢ ciently small, then they will not join the cartel even after the merger.
(b) To show that a merger could induce …rms to join the cartel, suppose there are eight pre-merger …rms with capacities of:
The pre-merger cartel is composed of …rms 1 and 2. If …rms 3 and 4 merge then the post-merger cartel can be shown to be made up of …rms 1, 2, and the merged …rm 3/4. A merger between …rms 3 and 4 expands their capacity su¢ ciently that the merged …rm wants to join …rms 1 and 2 in the cartel when, prior to the merger, both …rms 3 and 4 preferred not to be in the cartel. The post-merger cartel controls 50% more capacity.
The previous analysis suggests that coordinated e¤ects are likely to be greatest for a merger involving two moderate-sized …rms. To more fully explore this claim, simulations are performed when D (p) = 1 p and c = 0. Contrary to the preceding examples, it is not assumed that is su¢ ciently high that the ICC on price is not binding. A single simulation involves the following …ve steps.
Fix the number of …rms, n:
2. Randomly select a vector of capacities (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ) according to a uniform distribution over 0; 1 2 n . Requiring that each …rm's capacity is less than 1 2 ensures that the …rst part of A4 is satis…ed. Next check that P h6 =i;j k h 1; 8i; j: If that condition holds then the second part of A4 is satis…ed both in the premerger and any post-merger situation, in which case go to step 3. If instead P h6 =i;j k h < 1 for some i; j then redraw the vector of capacities until the condition is satis…ed.
3. Given (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ), randomly select the discount factor according to a uniform distribution over
By drawing from this interval, some collusion is sustainable. (Otherwise, a merger has no e¤ect.) 4. Given (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ) and ; derive the unique stable cartel involving the largest …rms. Record the pre-merger price.
5. Consider every possible two-…rm merger and, for each of them, derive the new stable cartel and post-merger price. Record the change in price due to the merger as well the rank of the …rms (in terms of capacity) involved in the merger.
This procedure is repeated 100,000 times and we report the price change from a merger (averaged over those 100,000 simulations) between the two largest …rms, the largest and second largest …rms, and so forth down to the two smallest …rms. With n …rms, there are 1 + 2 + + (n 1) possible mergers. This procedure is performed for n 2 f5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10g : Table 1 reports results for the case of …ve …rms, and we've ordered mergers in terms of the size of their price e¤ects. The biggest price e¤ect occurs when the two smallest …rms merge; the average price increase is 0.0297. The next biggest price e¤ect occurs when the median …rm and smallest …rm merge. A merger among any of the three largest …rms has no price e¤ect. Roughly speaking, larger price e¤ects tend to occur when smaller …rms are involved in the merger. However, as the number of non-large and non-small …rms is limited when there are only …ve …rms, more robust …ndings occur when we allow for more …rms. When n > 5, there are many types of merger so we organize the data by partitioning …rms into three categories: large, medium, and small. With six or nine …rms, the appropriate categorization is clear; when n = 6 (9) ; the …rms with the two (three) largest capacities are labelled large, the …rms with the two (three) smallest capacities are labelled small, and the remaining …rms are labelled medium. When the number of …rms is not divisible by three, we consider the three partitions that are closest to having n=3 in each category. For example, when n = 7, one partition has …rms ranked 1st, 2nd, and 3rd (in terms of capacity) being large, those ranked 4th and 5th being medium, and those ranked 6th and 7th being small; a second partition has …rms ranked 1st and 2nd being large, those ranked 3rd, 4th, and 5th being medium, and those ranked 6th and 7th being small; and a third partition has …rms ranked 1st and 2nd being large, those ranked 3rd and 4th being medium, and those ranked 5th, 6th, and 7th being small. Table 2 reports the price e¤ects from various mergers. Let us …rst analyze the case of six and nine …rms and then identify some general …ndings. When there are six …rms, a merger between a medium and small …rm has the biggest impact as price increases by 0.0255. A merger between two small …rms (that is, the two smallest …rms) is almost as signi…cant with a price increase of 0.024. A merger involving a large …rm has a trivial impact when it is with a large or medium …rm. When there are nine …rms, a merger between two medium …rms has the biggest price e¤ect, and a merger between a medium and small …rm has the next largest impact. Table 2 : Average price change due to a merger, n 2 f6; 7; 8; 9; 10g Looking across all of the cases in Table 2 , there are at least two general properties. First, the merger with the biggest price e¤ect involves a medium …rm and either another medium …rm or a small …rm. Second, a merger between two large …rms has the smallest impact and, with two exceptions, a merger between a large and a medium …rm has the next lowest impact. 14 Thus, contrary to previous research based on all-inclusive cartels, we do not …nd it is mergers involving the smallest or largest …rms that have the biggest coordinated e¤ects. Rather, it is mergers involving more moderate-size …rms that have the biggest impact on price. Intuitively, a merger between two moderate-sized …rms may signi…cantly expand the amount of capacity controlled by the cartel by inducing the merged …rm to become a cartel member.
Concluding Remarks
How encompassing is a cartel? What are the characteristics of the …rms which choose to collude? In spite of the large body of theoretical work on collusion, there is very little research that addresses these questions within the in…nitely repeated game framework. The objective of our research was to shed some light on these questions. We …nd that cartels are often incomplete. When a cartel is incomplete, colluding …rms set a price that serves as an umbrella with non-cartel members pricing below it and producing at capacity, while cartel members restrict supply below capacity. Su¢ ciently small …rms will not be part of a cartel and, more generally, a larger …rm is more inclined to join a cartel. Cartel membership is driven by the con ‡uence of two forces. First, the cartel price is increasing in the capacity controlled by the cartel which means that the cartel (and market) price is higher when a new member brings more capacity under the control of the cartel. Thus, a …rm with more capacity raises the cartel price more by joining. Second, in becoming a cartel member, a …rm experiences a drop in its sales as it goes from producing at capacity -as an outsider to the cartel -to producing less than capacity. Since a cartel member's share of cartel output is assumed to equal its share of cartel capacity, the percentage reduction in sales from joining a cartel is less for a …rm with more capacity. Both of these e¤ects serve to make a larger …rm more inclined to join a cartel.
One of the potentially more signi…cant policy contributions of the paper concerns the coordinated e¤ects of a merger. Previous theory focused attention on mergers that a¤ect the size of the largest or smallest …rm, while our analysis suggests that it is mergers involving …rms that lie between those extremes that may have the largest coordinated e¤ects. A merger between two moderate-sized …rms may signi…cantly expand the size and pro…tability of a potential cartel by inducing the merged …rm to be a cartel member. From the perspective of an antitrust or competition authority, concerns about coordinated e¤ects may be most severe for these mergers involving …rms which are not small, but not large either.
Appendix A: Derivation of the Proportional Sharing Rule
What is a reasonable way for a cartel to allocate demand among its members? To address this question, we begin by de…ning an allocation rule. For any capacity vector (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ) and cartel ; an allocation rule prescribes an allocation of cartel demand, D (p) (K K ) ; given a cartel price p. Assume allocation rules are anonymous in that they do not depend on a …rm's identity, only its capacity. Given (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ) and a cartel price p, let the resulting allocation be f i (p; k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; )g i2 where i is the quantity of …rm i. For an allocation to be implementable when p > c, it must satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints:
For allocation rule ; (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; ) denotes the set of incentive compatible prices given (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ) :
(k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; ) fp > c : (3) (4) are satis…edg :
As any allocation rule is required to distribute demand among cartel members so that ICCs are satis…ed, it now becomes a point of bargaining as to what is a reasonable allocation. Here, we apply the concept of fairness as articulated by Rawls (1971) . His perspective is that it is di¢ cult for people to agree as to what is fair when their place in society is already determined. For example, those who are poor …nd progressive taxation fair, while those who are wealthy …nd it unfair. To extract from those biases, Rawls proposes a thought experiment whereby people go behind the "veil of ignorance" and consider fairness before they've learned their place in society; what he refers to as the "original state".
Our approach to deriving a fair allocation rule is to apply this Rawlsian logic. Given some allocation of capacities, it is clear that a …rm with high capacity will …nd it fair that it receives more, while a …rm with low capacity may disagree. Let us then consider the thought experiment in which a …rm does not know its capacity. More speci…cally, given a capacity vector (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ) and a cartel , a …rm knows that it is a member of the cartel and that the cartel has capacities fk i g i2 ; but does not know which of the elements in that set is its capacity. In this original state, we want to show that …rms would agree to the proportional sharing rule, denoted e : e i (p; k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; )
Since allocation rules are anonymous, then, for any price, all cartel members have the same expected share of cartel pro…t. Therefore, all …rms rank allocation rules according to the amount of total cartel pro…t generated. We then say that allocation rule 0 is preferred to 00 when 0 produces at least as high total cartel pro…t as 00 for all (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ) and strictly higher pro…t for some (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ). Let p (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; ) be the pro…t maximizing price for the cartel given the allocation rule, . Noting that the ICCs must be satis…ed, it is de…ned by: p (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; ) = arg max p2 (k 1 ;:::;kn; ; )
Let p o (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ) = arg max
be the unconstrained optimal price for the cartel. Given the concavity of the objective function, the cartel's pro…t is strictly increasing in price for all p < p o (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; ) : Given the relationship between price and pro…t, it follows that 0 is preferred to 00 i¤ p k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; 0 p k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; 00 ; 8 (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ) and p k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; 0 > p k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; 00 ; for some (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ) :
Let us show that the proportional sharing rule e is preferred to all other allocation rules. If (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ) is such that p k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; e = p o (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; ) then clearly there is no other allocation rule that yields higher pro…t than the proportional sharing rule. Now consider (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ) such that p k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; e < p o (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; ) :
(It is straightforward to show that (5) holds for some (k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ).) (5) implies that one or more ICCs are binding. In fact, with e , either none or all ICCs are binding. The ICC of …rm i is
which is equivalent to
As this ICC is the same for all …rms then, if (5) holds, all …rms'ICCs are binding:
Continuing to assume that (5) holds, consider a di¤erent allocation rule, . Let us show that p k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; e > p k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; :
Consider p = p k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; e : If di¤ers from e then it allocates total cartel supply D p k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; e (K K ) di¤erently which means that at least one cartel member -say …rm j -must have lower quantity than what e prescribes. But then j < (1 ) k j in which case …rm j's ICC is violated. If p > p k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; e ; then total cartel supply is less than D p k 1 ; : : : ; k n ; ; e (K K ), in which case, again, there must be some cartel member whose allocated supply is lower than with e and thus its ICC is violated. We conclude that the proportional sharing rule e is preferred to any other allocation rule.
In essence, the proportional sharing rule does the best job of satisfying the ICCs in that, when the unconstrained optimal price cannot be supported, it allocates cartel supply in such a manner so as to loosen up the ICCs as much as possible. For consider another allocation rule which leaves some ICCs slack. In that situation, the cartel could set a higher price and -while there is less cartel supply to go around -the ICCs could still be satis…ed by reducing the allocation to those …rms with slack ICCs. A proportional sharing rule sets price as high as is possible by allocating cartel demand so that all ICCs bind and thus price cannot be any higher without violating the ICCs. As, behind the veil of ignorance, all …rms prefer an allocation rule that produces a higher price, fairness implies that they use the proportional sharing rule.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Given the cartel earns positive pro…t, …rst note that each noncolluding …rm earns positive pro…t because a non-colluding …rm can always match the collusive price and it will have positive demand (by A2) and positive pro…t (since the collusive price must be above cost).
Across non-colluding …rms, let p 00 be the highest upper bound to the support of their mixed strategies. Suppose p 00 > p 0 (in which case Lemma 1 is not true); p 00 may or may not be a mass point. Initially, assume only one non-colluding …rm has an upper bound of p 00 . Since
) which implies that this …rm has zero demand at a price of p 00 which implies zero pro…t and thus expected equilibrium pro…t of zero. This contradicts a non-colluding …rm earning positive pro…t. Now assume there are two or more …rms with an upper bound of p 00 ; again it is the highest upper bound across non-colluding …rms and p 00 > p 0 .
If those …rms put zero mass on p 00 then the preceding argument works to deliver a contradiction. If one or more …rms put positive mass on p 00 then consider a …rm with an upper bound of p 00 and for which there are other …rms putting positive mass at p 00 . When " is su¢ ciently small, its expected pro…t is higher by pricing at p 00 " than at p 00 because it experiences a discrete increase in demand with a trivial fall in the price-cost margin. This does presume that it is not capacity-constrained which is indeed true by A2 and that P n j=1 k j > D (p 00 ). This contradicts having p 00 in the support. Hence, the upper bound to all non-colluding …rms'supports cannot exceed p 0 .
Next we want to show that p 0 is not an upper bound either. Suppose it is. Since a non-colluding …rm's expected pro…t is positive, its expected pro…t (and demand) must be positive at a price of p 0 if p 0 is in its support. In addition, since the cartel is putting unit mass at p 0 ; a non-colluding …rm experiences a discrete increase in its expected demand by pricing at p 0 ". If " is su¢ ciently small, p 0 " is a pro…table deviation unless a …rm is capacity constrained. But since P n j=1 k j > D (p 0 ) then A2 implies this …rm has excess capacity.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since D (p 0 ) > P j = 2 k j then, if all non-colluding …rms price at p 0 "; each …rm is capacity-constrained by A3 and thereby sells k j units. Pro…t is then (p 0 " c) k j for non-colluding …rm j. Firm j lowering its price reduces its per unit pro…t without a¤ecting how many units it sells since it is capacity constrained. Thus, it doesn't want to price below p 0 ". By Lemma 1, it doesn't want to price at or above p 0 : Therefore, it is optimal for a non-colluding …rm to just undercut the price set by the cartel. 
and thus (i)-(ii) are true. Finally, suppose
< so that p (K 0 ) ; p (K 00 ) > c: As (ii) applies, we then need to prove:
If the ICC is not binding then p (K ) is de…ned by
Take the total derivative with respect to K ;
which follows from the second-order condition holding. If instead the ICC is binding then p (K ) is de…ned by
Since p (K ) is continuous and increasing in K then, when
Proof of Theorem 4. Given the collection of …rms are colluding, the cartel's problem is:
Suppose the cartel expands from 0 to 00 , which means cartel capacity rises from K 0 to K 00 : First note that if K is increased, the cartel's objective increases for any price,
Next note that increasing K loosens the ICC:
Since D (c) > K K 0 then the set of prices such that the ICC is satis…ed is nonempty for 0 and, by the preceding analysis, is strictly larger for 00 . Because the set of feasible (that is, incentive compatible) prices is larger with 00 and the objective is higher for any price with 00 , it follows that V ( 00 ) > V ( 0 ) : Proof of Theorem 6. Consider a cartel and a …rm that is not a member of . If its capacity is k; it prefers to join cartel i¤
where the LHS expression is the stationary pro…t from joining the cartel and the RHS is the stationary pro…t from remaining outside the cartel. This condition can be re-arranged to
Take the derivative of the expression in (6) with respect to k;
The second term in (7) is positive because p (K + k) c > 0 and K D (p (K + k)) > 0: (If K D (p (K + k)) 0 then the cartel would have zero residual demand and thus not be pro…table.) Since p 0 (K + k) > 0 was established in the proof of Theorem 3, the …rst term in (7) is non-negative i¤:
(8) holds with equality when the ICC is not binding and with inequality when the ICC is binding. Hence, (7) is positive. Suppose k j > k i . Since the expression in (6) is increasing in k, if (6) holds for …rm i then it holds for …rm j; and if (6) does not hold for …rm j then it does not hold for …rm i.
There are two forces at work behind Theorem 6. By Theorem 3, the cartel price is increasing in the capacity controlled by the cartel which means that the cartel price is higher when a new member brings more capacity under the control of the cartel. This e¤ect is captured by the …rst term in (7) . Secondly, in joining a cartel, a …rm experiences a drop in its sales as it goes from producing at capacity -as an outsider to the cartel -to producing less than capacity. This e¤ect is captured by the second term in (7) . Proof of Theorem 8. Evaluate (6) as a …rm's capacity becomes really small:
Proof of Lemma 11. The "only if" part is obvious, so let us consider the "if" part. Part (ii) follows immediately from Theorem 6. The remainder of the proof will show that if the smallest …rm in …nds it optimal to be in the cartel then all other …rms in …nd it optimal as well. Consider a …rm in with capacity k: It …nds it optimal to be a member of the cartel i¤
Next consider a larger member of whose capacity is k + where > 0: We want to show:
Using (9),
since, by assumption, (K ; k) > 0; and, by Theorem 3,
We have just proven that if a …rm in …nds it optimal to be a member of cartel then any larger …rm in also …nds it so. Hence, if the smallest …rm in …nds it optimal to be a member of cartel then all …rms in …nd it so.
Proof of Theorem 12. If (n) > 0 then the smallest …rm of cartel f1; 2; : : : ; ng prefers to be in the cartel and there is no largest …rm outside of the cartel. By Lemma 11, f1; 2; : : : ; ng is then a stable cartel. Suppose instead (n) 0 and m o exists. By the de…nition of m o ; …rm m o prefers to be in cartel f1; 2; : : : ; m o g and …rm m o + 1 prefers to be outside the cartel. By Lemma 11, f1; 2; : : : ; m o g is a stable cartel. We conclude that f1; 2; : : : ; m g is a stable cartel.
To prove existence, if (n) > 0 then m = n and thus m exists. Now sup-
Given that p (k 1 ) = c (that is, a "cartel" composed only of …rm 1 leads to the static Nash equilibrium price by A4) and p P n 1 i=1 k i > c; there exists m 0 2 f2; : : : ; n 1g such that
In other words, f1; 2; : : : ; m 0 g is the least inclusive collection of the largest …rms that is able to sustain collusion. Hence,
Since (m 0 ) > 0 (n) ; there exists m o 2 fm 0 ; : : : ; n 1g such that (m o ) > 0 (m o + 1) : Thus, m exists.
Proof of Theorem 13.
We want to prove that there exists a unique stable cartel under the assumption that cartels consist of the largest …rms, as characterized by Theorem 12. Suppose there exists a stable cartel comprising the largest …rms (Theorem 12 provides su¢ cient conditions for existence). Let (m) f1; : : : ; mg denote a cartel comprising the m largest …rms. Denote the smallest stable cartel to be f1; : : : ; m 0 g or (m 0 ) : To prove uniqueness, we will show that (m) is unstable for all m > m 0 :
Since (m 0 ) is stable then …rm m 0 + 1 prefers not to be in the cartel: "
Our method of proof will be to show that (10) implies: "
(11) implies, for all m > m 0 ; that (m) is not stable because …rm m doesn't want to be part of the cartel. In working with (11), the particular form it takes depends on whether or not the ICC for price is binding. If it is not binding for cartel then the cartel price is
and if it is binding then
As a preliminary result, let us show that if the ICC is not binding for cartel then it is not binding for cartel 0 where K 0 > K : Suppose that property did not hold so that the ICC is not binding for and is binding for 0 . Using (12)- (13) , that it is not binding for means
and that it is binding for 0 means
Since K (a bc) > 0 then the LHS inequality implies > 1=2. Thus, a necessary condition for this inequality to be true is K K 0 which is a contradiction. Thus, if the ICC is not binding for some cartel then it is not binding for any larger cartel ("larger" meaning it has more capacity).
From the preceding result, there are then three possible cases with respect to cartel : 1) The ICC is not binding for cartel and all larger cartels; 2) The ICC is binding for cartel and all larger cartels; and 3) The ICC is binding for cartel and there is some larger cartel 0 for which it is not binding. Note that case #3 implies the ICC is binding for all cartels smaller than 0 and is not binding for all cartels larger than 0 : In showing that (10) implies (11), we will consider each of these three cases for cartel (m 0 ) : Recall that (m 0 ) is the smallest stable cartel comprising the largest …rms.
Let us begin with Case #1 so that the ICC is not binding for (m) ; for all m m 0 : Substituting (12) into (11) and performing some simpli…cations, the expression in (11) can be shown to take the form:
Since
(15) then (10) implies (11) .
Next consider Case #2 so that the ICC is binding for (m) ; for all m m 0 : Substituting (13) into (11) and performing some simpli…cations, the expression in (11) can be shown to take the form:
(17) then (10) implies (11) .
Case #3 has the ICC binding for cartel (m 0 ) and there exists m 00 2 fm 0 ; : : : ; n 1g whereby it is binding for (m) i¤ m m 00 . Note that if (m 00 + 1) is unstable then, by the analysis associated with Case #1, (m) is unstable for all m > m 00 + 1: We also know that (m 0 + 1) is unstable. Case #3 is divided into two sub-cases: a) m 00 = m 0 ; and b) m 00 > m 0 :
For Case #3a, we have m 00 = m 0 : We need only show that (m 0 + 2) is unstable when the ICC is not binding. Using (14) , (m 0 + 2) is unstable i¤
Rearranging, we have
The LHS of (18) is weakly negative because k m 0 +1 k m 0 +2 . It therefore su¢ ces to show that the RHS of (18) 
(19) holds because the stability of (m 0 ) implies P m 0 j=1 k j > K (a bc). For Case #3b, we have m 00 > m 0 ; and recall that the ICC is binding i¤ m m 00 : We need to show that (m) is unstable for all m 2 fm 0 + 2; : : : ; m 00 + 1g. By the analysis associated with case #2, (11) is satis…ed for all m 2 fm 0 + 1; : : : ; m 00 1g and, therefore, (m) is unstable for all m 2 fm 0 + 1; : : : ; m 00 1g : Thus, we just need to show that (m) is unstable for m 2 fm 00 ; m 00 + 1g.
In considering (m 00 ), …rst note that the internal stability condition of …rm m 00 for cartel (m 00 ) is the converse of the external stability condition of …rm m 00 for cartel (m 00 1) ; the former condition requires that …rm m 00 strictly prefers to join (m 00 1), while the latter condition requires that …rm m 00 weakly prefers not to join (m 00 1). As we know the latter condition holds then the internal stability condition for …rm m 00 for (m 00 ) is violated. Hence, (m 00 ) is unstable.
This leaves the case of cartel (m 00 + 1) : First observe that:
as the ICC is binding for (m 00 ) (which is the LHS inequality) and the ICC is not binding for (m 00 + 1) (which is the RHS inequality). We will show that …rm m 00 + 1 has no incentive to join (m 00 ), which is the case i¤: Re-arranging this condition, we have to show:
(a bc) K + P m 00 +1 j=1 k j 2 + 4 P m 00 +1 j=1 k j (K (a bc)) 4 P m 00 +1 j=1 k j P m 00 j=1 k j :
We know from (20) that
(21) then holds if the RHS of (22) exceeds the RHS of (21):
which is equivalent to 
We know that residual demand for cartel (m 00 ) is positive, and that k m 00 k m 00 +1 . Hence, (24) holds and …rm m 00 + 1 has no incentive to join cartel (m 00 ), which implies that (m 00 + 1) is unstable. participants are su¢ ciently small, they were not part of the cartel. For a non-merger participant that was not part of a pre-merger condition, its external stability condition is una¤ected. Finally, by Theorem 8, if the merged …rm is su¢ ciently small then it will not be part of any stable cartel.
